Tamar Barkay | The decline of organized labor and the rise of internal Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
Questo articolo, pubblicato su Economic Sociology & Political Economy e in forma completa su Social Responsibility Journal, mette a confronto l’enorme declino del tasso di sindacalizzazione nei paesi OCSE con la crescita della retorica sulla “responsabilità sociale” dell’impresa nei confronti dei lavoratori (quella che qui viene definita internal CSR) affermando un punto: la sostituzione della sindacalizzazione e delle lotte sociali con il paternalismo padronale e le sue operazioni di “social washing” non pone alcun argine all’arretramento dei lavoratori dal punto di vista del salario e dei diritti. [Antiper]
Are the inverse trajectories of internal corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the decline of organized labor in the past decades linked? If so, how?
These questions arise from three widely recognized observations. First, since the 1980s, most OECD countries have experienced a decline in unionization and union density rates (Visser, 2012). Second, following the rise and standardization of CSR since the 1990s, measures directed towards employees—often referred to in the literature as ‘internal CSR’—have increasingly become key elements of corporate CSR policies (Mori et al., 2016; Farooq et al., 2017). Third, while the decline of organized labor and the rise of CSR vary in their form, scope, and intensity across countries and corporations, both trends have been accelerated by economic globalization and the liberalization of labor markets (de Bakker et al., 2020).
Much scholarship has highlighted the implications of the rhetoric-practice gap between CSR codes of conduct and the actual working conditions and rights, including the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining, for supply chain workers in the global South (Anner, 2012; Egels-Zandén and Merk, 2014). Yet far less attention has been given to this gap in relation to the collective rights of in-house employees in the global North. This omission is particularly glaring, given that the vast majority of industry codes of conduct include internationally recognized labor standards and rights.
My interest in this gap was sparked by the realization that, despite the widespread recognition of collective rights within CSR discourse and the unprecedented growth of CSR over recent decades, organized labor has not only failed to benefit but has declined drastically. This understanding raises the question of whether CSR may have negatively impacted workers’ collective voice and rights. To explore this question while avoiding a cause-and-effect explanation, I employed the Weberian notion of ‘elective affinity,’ which allows for the delineation of normative and structurally mutually reinforcing connections among distinct phenomena (Steurer, 2013).
Through a metatheoretical analysis of the academic literature on internal CSR in countries in the global North, I identified a disparity between rhetoric and practice concerning the rights of in-house employees. This disparity compounds the aforementioned gap between the extensive research on violations of the collective rights of value chain workers and the limited attention given to the collective rights of in-house employees. I suggest two factors contribute to these disparities: first, the integration of internal CSR into the corporate strategic managerial toolbox aimed at enhancing employees’ positive attitudes towards their employers and workplace environment, while mitigating organizational risks associated with negative employee attitudes. In doing so, corporations seek to attract, retain, and motivate employees while downplaying or neglecting their collective rights. Second, the distinction in CSR discourse between core labor standards and workplace issues. For example, in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards, core labor standards are listed under the ‘Human Rights’ sub-category, while other employment indicators, such as labor/management relations, occupational health and safety, work-life balance, training, and diversity, are listed under the ‘Labour practices and decent work’ sub-category. As the most widely used standards for ESG (environmental, social and governance) reporting, the GRI contributes to the institutionalization of this distinction, arguably reflecting the (erroneous) belief that core labor standards are less relevant to internal workforces in the global North, given their solid (formal or normative) regulatory mechanisms.
This analysis demonstrates that internal CSR and the decline of organized labor are not only ‘adequate’ phenomena, bearing structural homology and temporal alignment, but also reinforce each other in weakening employees’ collective power resources, enhancing power imbalances between management and employees, and undermining workers’ collective solidarity. Specifically, I argue that while the decline of organized labor has eroded workers’ collective rights and voice by promoting corporate flexibility, internal CSR sustains this erosion by addressing employees’ needs and interests as individuals. To be sure, internal CSR and the decline of organized labor have materialized in complex social realities and diverse institutional and geographical contexts and present distinct and contingent phenomena. Therefore, their structural resemblance in consequences cannot be accounted for by an empirical causality argument. Nevertheless, by employing the concept of ‘elective affinity’ as an interpretive scheme, I suggest that internal CSR legitimizes market liberalism agendas, including de-unionization and the overall decline in the power of organized labor, and may have been instrumental in depoliticizing employment relations. In sum, the decline in organized labor in recent decades has been accompanied by the erosion of workers’ collective voice, an increase in poverty among workers, and a widening gap in wealth and income distribution. The mainstreaming of strategic and managerial approaches to CSR has allowed it to shift away from addressing such socio-economic challenges and, concomitantly, has enhanced the alignment of CSR schemes with corporate and organizational values and goals.
References:
– Anner, M. (2012). Corporate social responsibility and freedom of association rights: The precarious quest for legitimacy and control in global supply chains. Politics & society, 40(4), 609-644.
– De Bakker, F. G., Matten, D., Spence, L. J., & Wickert, C. (2020). The elephant in the room: The nascent research agenda on corporations, social responsibility, and capitalism. Business & Society, 59(7), 1295-1302.
– Egels-Zandén, N., & Merk, J. (2014). Private regulation and trade union rights: Why codes of conduct have limited impact on trade union rights. Journal of Business Ethics, 123, 461-473.
– Farooq, O., Rupp, D. E., & Farooq, M. (2017). The multiple pathways through which internal and external corporate social responsibility influence organizational identification and multifoci outcomes: The moderating role of cultural and social orientations. Academy of management journal, 60(3), 954-985.
– Mory, L., Wirtz, B. W., & Göttel, V. (2016). Factors of internal corporate social responsibility and the effect on organizational commitment. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 27(13), 1393-1425.
– Steurer, R. (2013). Disentangling governance: a synoptic view of regulation by government, business and civil society. Policy Sciences, 46, 387-410.
– Visser, J. (2012). The rise and fall of industrial unionism. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 18(2), 129-141.
Note
[*] (Nota Antiper) Quella che qui viene chiamata “densità sindacale” – e che possiamo chiamare più semplicemente “tasso di sindacalizzazione” – è il rapporto tra il numero di lavoratori iscritti alle organizzazioni sindacali e il numero totale di lavoratori. Come si vede dal grafico, negli ultimi 50 anni, nei paesi OCSE, si è passati dal 35% al 5%, nonostante larga parte delle organizzazioni sindacali dei paesi OCSE fosse, almeno a partire dagli anni ’80, assai poco combattiva e assai collaborativa con le imprese.
